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Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element
of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It
can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in
the world can be explained by the lack of mutual conﬁdence. ðArrow
1972Þ
I. Introduction
A large literature has shown that trust contributes to growth and development,
political success, and social well-being ðKnack and Keefer 1997; La Porta et al.
1997; Zak and Knack 2001; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2009; Algan and
Cahuc 2010Þ. Trust reduces transaction costs dramatically and contributes to
the efﬁciency of economic organizations ðFukuyama 1995Þ. In contrast, low
trust increases demand for regulation ðAghion et al. 2010Þ, and low levels of
trustworthiness hinder the development of social capital necessary for eco-
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nomic development ðNeace 2004Þ. Trust and trustworthiness are also nec-
essary for democratization ðTilly 2005Þ. Better understanding their deter-
minants is therefore fundamental.
In this article, we investigate how trust and trustworthiness relate to risk
aversion, loss aversion, and time preferences, by conducting an artifactual ﬁeld
experiment in villages in the north and the south of Vietnam. We use a game
in which trust is proxied by the amount sent by a trustor to an anonymous
trustee. In contrast with the standard game of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe
ð1995Þ but like in Buchan, Johnson, and Croson ð2006Þ, the trustee can send
back any amount of his total wealth ði.e., the tripled amount received from the
trustor and an initial endowmentÞ. We can use the percentage of total wealth
returned to the trustor as a proxy of trustworthiness. The novel contribution
of our approach is that we do not study risk attitudes in the framework of the
expected utility ðEUÞ theory, in contrast with most of the previous literature
on trust, but we use instead the tools provided by the prospect theory to have
a more precise understanding of the individual underpinnings of social pref-
erences. Another novelty of our approach is that we consider the possible links
between trust and time preferences. So far, no study has investigated this link,
although we suspect that individuals’ intertemporal preferences may affect their
attitudes in the trust game.
Although trusting behavior has been widely studied either through value sur-
veys or experimentally ðGlaeser et al. 2000Þ, there is no consensus on its links
with basic human preferences ðCamerer 2003; Fehr 2009Þ. Both behavioral
studies ðAndreoni and Miller 2002; Cox 2004; Ashraf, Bohnet, and Piankov
2006Þ and neuroscientiﬁc studies ðKosfeld et al. 2005; Baumgartner et al.
2008Þ have shown that social preferences, notably betrayal aversion ðBohnet
and Zeckhauser 2004; Bohnet et al. 2008Þ, play a major role in trusting be-
havior. But this does not exclude a role of risk preferences in trusting behavior
ðBen-Ner and Putterman 2001; Cook and Cooper 2003Þ. Indeed, trusting
others means making oneself vulnerable to a counterpart who can decide to
reciprocate or betray, which creates uncertainty. For example, Karlan ð2005Þ
and Schechter ð2007Þ have found that higher trust correlates with less risk
aversion, even after controlling for altruism ðsee also Fehr 2009; Naef and
Schupp 2009Þ. In contrast, Eckel and Wilson ð2004Þ, Ashraf et al. ð2006Þ,
Houser, Schunk, and Winter ð2010Þ, and McEvily, Radzevick, and Weber
ð2012Þ have found no correlation between trust and risk attitudes.
The unclear link between risk attitudes and trusting behavior in the liter-
ature is possibly because most measures involve lotteries that may not capture
the attitudes toward strategic uncertainty. Moreover, many studies do not elicit
individual risk preferences but simply compare the distributions of decisions in
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trust and risk games ðHouser et al. 2010Þ.1 Finally, the studies that elicit
individual risk attitudes usually assume that individuals behave according to
EU theory and only characterize risk preferences by choices of lotteries in the
domain of gains.2 Yet, this assumption has been frequently challenged, and
the prospect theory offers a richer approach to risk attitudes ðKahneman and
Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Wakker 2010Þ. EU theory may
be inadequate if participants evaluate the possible outcomes of their decisions
relative to a reference point or if there is an endowment effect. One can hy-
pothesize that loss averse individuals are less willing to trust others because
sending money to a trustee without any guarantee of return may entail a loss in
income; if people are loss averse, analyzing the link between trust and risk
preferences only on the basis of the concavity of the utility function will bias
the estimates. For that reason, we expand the measurement of risk preferences
to incorporate prospect theory like in Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen ð2010Þ.3
We measure the correlation between trust and the curvature of the utility
function, nonlinear probability weighting, and loss aversion.4
We also provide the ﬁrst analysis of the links between behavior in the trust
game and time preferences. Our intuition is that in real life settings, more
patient people may be more likely to behave in ways that preserve long-term
mutually beneﬁcial relationships, while more impulsive people may not be
able to resist the temptation of behaving selﬁshly. We hypothesize that self-
control ðcaptured by the present bias parameterÞ and future orientation may
motivate individuals to send more and to return more, instead of taking proﬁts
1 In Ashraf et al. ð2006Þ, people make choices between a risky gamble and a deterministic payoff. In
the risk game of Schechter ð2007Þ and McEvily et al. ð2012Þ, players choose the amount of a bet for
which return depends on the roll of a die. Snijders and Keren ð1999Þ measure risk by varying the
payoff structure in the trust game. Bohnet and Zeckhauser ð2004Þ and Bohnet et al. ð2008Þ compare
behavior facing social risk and state risk.
2 In Eckel and Wilson ð2004Þ, risk attitudes are elicited through choices between lotteries. But if
these attitudes do not predict behavior in the trust game, they also do not predict decisions in their
risk game in which subjects choose between lotteries and certain amounts. Houser et al. ð2010Þ also
elicit individual risk attitudes with the Holt and Laury ð2002Þ procedure and show that they predict
behavior in risk games but not in trust games. Karlan ð2005Þ proxies risk attitudes with comparisons
of the participants’ borrowings and savings in a microcredit program.
3 In contrast to Tanaka et al. ð2010Þ, we ﬁrst play the risk preferences experiment to avoid having
payments from previous games affect the reference point in prospect theory. We also decrease the
number of binary choices in the risk experiment, to facilitate the participant’s comprehension.
4 Bohnet, Herrmann, and Zeckhauser ð2010Þ also study the role of reference points for trustworthi-
ness on gain/loss utility from trusting behavior, by eliciting the minimum acceptable probability of
trustworthiness that makes the subjects just willing to trust a stranger and by comparing it with the
minimum acceptable probability for an equivalent gamble. In contrast, we cannot compare the reference
point for trusting and for gambling directly, but we estimate the value of each parameter of the prospect
theory precisely.
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right away. From a theoretical perspective, studies have shown that it is too
restrictive to measure time preferences by an exponential discount rate ðsee
Laibson 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001; Tanaka et al. 2010Þ. For that
reason, we estimate a quasi-hyperbolic function following Benhabib, Bisin, and
Schotter ð2010Þ and relate discounting rate and present bias to trustors’ and
trustees’ decisions.
Finally, since trust and the institutional structure of a countrymay be strongly
tied together ðKnack and Keefer 1997; Hardin 2002Þ, we conducted the ex-
periment in two regions of the same country that are characterized by a differ-
ent political and economic history.5 We analyze whether the effects of risk and
time preferences on behavior in the trust game differ in the north and the south
of Vietnam. The ability to compare different institutional settings in the same
country gives our study a high degree of control compared to cross-country stud-
ies ðlike in Ockenfels andWeimann 1998 or Brosig-Koch et al. 2011Þ.6 Another
strength of our study is that our participants come from villages with a wide
range of average incomes. The use of detailed survey data to control the design
ðby stratifying samplesÞ and to link survey results to experimental results is a rare
feature for this kind of study.
Our main ﬁndings show that trustors’ decisions are positively affected by
the expectation of a higher return from the trustee. We do not ﬁnd any effect of
concavity of the utility function, loss aversion, and present bias on the amount
sent to the trustees. Yet, higher time discounting increases this amount in the
south subsample, and probability weighting decreases it in the north sub-
sample. Time discounting and loss aversion do not inﬂuence trustees’ behavior,
but more risk-averse and less present-biased trustees return a higher share of
their wealth to the trustor. Thus, using the approach of the prospect theory and
5 The north of Vietnam has a much longer communist history than the south since its establishment
in 1945, while South Vietnam was under the French and then the US regime between 1945 and 1975.
The two states were merged in 1975 and uniﬁed politically as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Since
1986, the country has initiated market-oriented economic reforms. Therefore, the north followed a
Soviet-style model of central planning for a long period ð1954–75Þ—whereas the south followed a
market economy during that same period. Differences in the history of communism in the two regions
could inﬂuence individual’s beliefs and expectations. Fox and Joiner ð1964Þ conducted a survey in the
south before the uniﬁcation and observed animosity toward northerners. By 1986, less than 6% of the
farmers in the south participated in cooperatives, compared to 95% in the north ðPingali and Xuan
1992; Xuan 1995Þ. We expect that such differences in market exposure would relate to differences in
trusting behavior between northern and southern participants in our study.
6 The literature includes many cross-country comparisons on trust ðYamagishi, Cook, and Watabe
1998; Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi 2004; Ashraf et al. 2006; Bohnet et al. 2008, 2010Þ, but
within-country comparisons are relatively rare ðOckenfels and Weimann 1998; Bahry and Wilson
2004; Tanaka et al. 2010; Brosig-Koch et al. 2011; see also Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007, on
redistributive preferencesÞ.
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of hyperbolic time discounting allows us to identify aspects of the relationships
between trust and risk and time preferences that could not be uncovered by
previous studies using the framework of the EU theory. Important regional
differences are also found, with people in the north holding more pessimistic
expectations on others’ trustworthiness and behaving less reciprocally than
people in the south. These behavioral differences may result from long-lasting
institutional differences and a longer market integration in the south, which
may have favored norms of reciprocity.
In the remainder of this article, Section II describes the experimental design
and procedures. Section III analyzes the results, and Section IV concludes.
II. Experimental Design and Implementation
A. The Three Tasks
In this experiment like in Tanaka et al. ð2010Þ each session was composed
of three different decision-making tasks, performed in sequence: a risk elicita-
tion task, a time preference elicitation task, and a trust game.7 Since our study
focuses on trust, we present ﬁrst the trust game before introducing the other
tasks. All the instructions can be found in appendix 1, available online.
The Trust Game
Our trust game is played under the strategy method.8 All the players act ﬁrst
as trustors ðplayer AÞ and then as trustees ðplayer BÞ. Each player is initially
endowed with KVND 20.9 In the ﬁrst stage, the trustor decides how much
of his endowment to send ðxÞ to the trustee, among the following choices:
KVND 0, 5, 10, 15, and 20. This restricted number of options aims at sim-
plifying the game. The amount sent is multiplied by three before it reaches the
trustee, to create positive externalities. Like in Eckel andWilson ð2004Þ and in
Ashraf et al. ð2006Þ, we ask the trustor to report how much return he expects
from the trustee conditional on the amount he sent to him, as we expect that
part of trust is calculative ðHardin 2002Þ. For simplicity and to avoid hedging,
we do not incentivize belief elicitation.
7 We always ran the trust game at the end of the sessions because it is the most difﬁcult game to play.
Thus, we cannot control for order effects, but we thought that it was more important to facilitate the
subjects’ understanding.
8 In their survey, Brandts and Charness ð2011Þ show that in this type of game the strategy method
produces similar behavior to the direct-response method. This is conﬁrmed by the meta-analysis of
Johnson and Mislin ð2011a, 2011bÞ.
9 VND refers to Vietnamese dongs; K represents thousand. On average, the mean daily income for
unskilled work in Vietnam in 2010 was around KVND 35 ðaround US$2Þ. Both players receive the
same endowment, so that they are ex ante equal in terms of experimental wealth.
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In the second stage, all players act as trustees and have to decide how much
they are willing to return to the trustor ð yÞ for each possible amount sent by
the trustor. We keep constant the order in which subjects made decisions for
facilitating their understanding. Like in Buchan et al. ð2006Þ the trustees can
return any share of their total wealth ði.e., the tripled amount received from
the trustor plus the endowmentÞ to the trustor. This is different from the
standard trust game of Berg et al. ð1995Þ in which trustees can only send back
a share of the amount received from the trustor. From a theoretical perspec-
tive, however, the two designs deliver the same predictions regarding both the
trustee’s and trustor’s behavior ðsee app. 2, available onlineÞ. In order to fa-
cilitate the calculation of payoffs, participants are given tables with examples
for each possible amount sent.
Before the game starts, each participant is given randomly a tag colored
either red or white. At the end of the game once all players have made their
decisions in both roles, we toss a coin. If head comes up, the participants
with red tags are assigned the role of the trustor, and those with white tags the
role of the trustee. We pair players randomly, and we implement the players’
actual decisions corresponding to their role. The ﬁnal payoff of the trustor is
ð20 2 x 1 yÞ and that of the trustee is ð20 1 3  x 2 yÞ.
Elicitation of Risk Preferences
To measure the three parameters that characterize risk attitudes in the prospect
theory ðutility concavity, probability weighting, and loss aversionÞ, we ask par-
ticipants to make decisions in three series of paired lotteries including respec-
tively 12, 14, and seven questions ðsee app. 1Þ. Each question is a choice be-
tween two binary lotteries, A or B. Each decision is made by choosing a reward
with a certain probability represented by a number of balls, with each ball
marked by a number from 1 to 10. In the ﬁrst series, plan A is ﬁxed at KVND
40 with probability 0.3 and KVND 10 with probability 0.7. Plan B is half ﬁxed
and half changing. The payoff is always KVND 5 with probability 0.9, and, as
onemoves down the rows, the payoff is fromKVND68 to 600 with probability
0.1. Series 2 is similar, but with different payoffs and probabilities. Plan A is
always ﬁxed, at KVND 40 with probability 0.9 and KVND 30 with proba-
bility 0.1. In plan B the payoff is KVND 5 with probability 0.3 and, moving
down the rows, from KVND 54 to 130 with probability 0.7. In series 1 and
2, individuals are expected to choose plan A in the ﬁrst row and, as the high-
potential payoff increases in plan B down the rows, to switch to preferring B to
A. A risk-averse person should switch later than a risk-neutral one.
To address loss aversion, series 3 involves both gains and losses in plans A
and B. In either plan the probabilities of gains and losses are the same: 0.5.
550 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G E
This content downloaded from 159.084.201.001 on April 11, 2016 04:37:48 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
The differences between plan A and plan B lie in two points. First, in plan B,
the gains and losses are all much larger than in plan A. Second, in plan B, gains
are always KVND 30, while the amount that can be lost decreases from
KVND 21 to 11, as one moves down the rows. In plan A, the amount of gains
decreases and the amount of losses increases across rows, with the gains
varying from KVND 5 to 1 and the losses varying from KVND 4 to 8. The
later they switch from A to B, the more averse individuals are to losses.
In all three series, we enforce monotonic switching by asking participants at
which question they would “switch” from plan A to plan B. They can switch
starting with the ﬁrst question, and it is made clear in the instructions that
they do not have to switch at all if they do not want to. After completing the
three series of questions, a participant is selected to draw a numbered ball from
a bingo cage with 33 numbered balls, to determine which row of choice will
be played for real money. Then, we put 10 balls in the cage. Another partic-
ipant selected as before draws one ball randomly to determine the outcome of
the lottery.
We use cumulative prospect theory ðTversky and Kahneman 1992Þ and
the one-parameter form of Prelec’s axiomatically derived weighting function
ð1998Þ. The expected prospect value over binary prospects consisting of out-
come x with probability p and outcome y with probability q is represented
as Uðx, p; y, qÞ. Given this setup, we deﬁne the prospect theory utility as
follows:
U ðx; p; y; qÞ5 w1 ðp1 qÞvðxÞ1 w1 ðqÞðvð yÞ  vðxÞÞ if 0 < x < y; ð1Þ
U ðx; p; y; qÞ5 w−ð p1 qÞvðxÞ1 wðqÞ−ðvð yÞ  vðxÞÞ if y < x < 0; ð2Þ
U ðx; p; y; qÞ5 w−ð pÞvðxÞ1 w 1 ðqÞðvð yÞÞ if x < 0 < y; ð3Þ
where vðxÞ denotes the power value function, with
vðxÞ5 xσ for x ≥ 0; ð4Þ
vðxÞ5 −λð−x σÞ for x < 0; ð5Þ
wð pÞ5 exp½−ð− ln pÞα; ð6Þ
where σ represents the concavity of the power value function and indicates
increasing or decreasing marginal value of money. In the domain of gains, an
individual is considered risk neutral if σ5 1, risk averse if σ > 1, and a risk lover
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if σ < 1. Parameter l represents the degree of loss aversion, with higher values of
λ associated with higher loss aversion. The probability weighting function is
linear if a5 1 ðas in the EU theoryÞ. If a > 1, the weighting function is S-shaped
ðthe individual underweights small probabilities and overweights large prob-
abilitiesÞ. If a < 1, it is inverted S-shaped ðthe individual overweights small
probabilities and underweights large probabilitiesÞ. We use Prelec’s weighting
function because it is ﬂexible enough to accommodate the cases in which indi-
viduals have either inverted-S- or S-shaped weighting functions and has ﬁt previ-
ous data reasonably well. If a 5 1 and λ 5 1, the EU theory is not rejected.
Tables A1 and A2 in appendix 3, available online, present the predicted
values of the parameters for the curvature of the utility function ðσÞ and for
the probability sensitivity in Prelec’s weighting function ðaÞ for all possible
combinations of switching points in series 1 and 2.10 Similarly table A3 in
appendix 3 presents the estimates of the ranges of the loss aversion parameter,
λ, for three possible values of σ ð0.2, 0.6, and 1Þ.
Elicitation of Time Preferences
To measure the quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameters that characterize
time preferences ðtime discounting and present biasÞ, we ask participants to
make 75 decisions between receiving money either tomorrow or at speciﬁed
times in the future ðsee app. 1Þ. Each question is a choice between plan A that
offers smaller rewards tomorrow ð“Receive VND x tomorrow”Þ and plan B
that offers larger rewards some time in the future ð“Receive VND y in t days”Þ.
We use 15 combinations of y and t that deﬁne 15 types of plan B. For each y,
t combination, x increases as rows move on, equaling 1/6, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3, and
5/6 of the value of y. In other words, in each type of plan B, plan A changes
with an increasing payoff across ﬁve choices. The rewards x and y vary between
KVND 5 and 250 and between KVND 30 and 300, respectively. The time
delay t varies from 3 days to 3 months. In plan A the payment date is to-
morrow, so that regardless of the plan, the participants have to come back to
receive their earnings. The earlier switchers from B to A are less patient. Our
design is therefore different from Tanaka et al. ð2010Þ in which the early date
is today. If participants have any doubt about the certainty of future payoffs,
they may prefer plan A not because they are impatient but because they do
not trust the experimenters on receiving money in the future or because they
10 Suppose a participant switched from plan A to plan B at the second question in series 1 and third
question in series 2. The lower and higher bounds for σ are 1.16 and 1.29, and the lower and upper
bounds for a are 0.56 and 0.64. The mean values of lower and upper bounds indicate that the value
of σ ðaÞ for this participant is 1.2 ð0.6Þ.
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want to minimize transaction costs. In our design, no payment for this task
can be made immediately, and only the time lag between the two options can
vary. Therefore, the preference for either the early or the later payment should
only reveal intertemporal preferences.
In all 15 sets of ﬁve questions, we enforce monotonic switching by asking
participants at which question they would “switch” from plan B to plan A.
After all participants completed the 75 questions, we put 75 balls into a bingo
cage, and one ball is randomly drawn by a participant to select a question that
will determine how much money they earned and when this money would be
delivered. We then ask the participants to discuss about to whom the money
should be entrusted until they pick it up on the delivered date ðvillage heads,
commune ofﬁcers, etc.Þ. For each participant, we put the money they earned
in an envelope and wrote down their name, the amount they should receive,
and the date they should pick it up from the entrusted person. The entrusted
person would keep all the envelopes until the pickup date.
These pairwise choices permit estimation of the three-factor model devel-
oped by Benhabib et al. ð2010Þ. The model values a reward of y at time t
according to yDðy, tÞ, where
yDð y; tÞ5 y if t 5 0; ð7Þ
yDð y; tÞ5 βð1− ð1− θÞrtÞ 1
1− θ
y if t > 0: ð8Þ
The three factors r, b, and v separate conventional time discounting ðrÞ, pres-
ent bias ðbÞ, and hyperbolicity ðvÞ of the discount function Dð y, tÞ.11 Tanaka
et al. ð2010Þ show that including all behavioral parameters does not improve
the model ﬁtness signiﬁcantly. For the purpose of this study, we assume v equal
to 1 and estimate b. Our model speciﬁcation for time preferences is thus based
on the quasi-hyperbolic discounting framework. A higher value of b means
that the individual is less present biased.
11 Andersen et al. ð2008Þ and Andreoni and Sprenger ð2012Þ have pointed out that the estimates of
time preferences can be biased if one assumes risk neutrality. Using the same data as Tanaka et al.
ð2010Þ, Nguyen ð2011Þ has applied a structural approach to jointly estimate risk and time
preference parameters. These estimates were very similar to those in Tanaka et al. ð2010Þ. Given this
ﬁnding, we apply here the same estimation method as Tanaka et al. ð2010Þ. We have, however,
reestimated our parameters using the maximum simulated likelihood approach. We found that only
the discount rate and the loss aversion parameters in the south were ðweaklyÞ signiﬁcantly different
between the two estimation methods.
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B. Conjectures
Conjecture 1: Both risk aversion ðσ > 1Þ and loss aversion ðhigher λÞ affect negatively
the amount transferred to the trustee because there is a probability that some trustees
keep the money transferred for themselves. There is no conjecture as regards the link
between the shape of the probability weighting function ðgiven by aÞ and trust.
Conjecture 2: The proportion of total wealth returned by the trustee could be reduced
by loss aversion, since it represents a loss for the trustee if the reference point is the
money he has received from the trustor. It should be affected neither by risk aversion
nor by the shape of the probability weighting function since there is no uncertainty
associated with the return decision.
Conjecture 3: Patience ðmeasured by a lower discount rate r and lower present bias,
i.e., a higher value of bÞ affects positively the amount transferred by the trustor if we
assume that long-term planning and lower impulsiveness are more likely to support
the social norm of cooperation.
Conjecture 4: Patience increases the proportion returned by the trustee since not
keeping the amount received for one’s own beneﬁt requires self-control and future
orientation.
C. Experimental Procedures
We conducted our ﬁeld experiment in eight villages in Vietnam: four villages
of two provinces in the north and four villages of two provinces in the south.12
We collected data from 166 participants in total, 87 participants in the north
and 79 participants in the south.13 A typical lab-in-the-ﬁeld experiment like
ours may potentially face two types of selection bias: the selection of house-
holds and the selection of family members as participants in our experiment.
To limit the ﬁrst source of bias, we invited members of all the households who
were interviewed during the 2002 Vietnam Household Living Standard
Surveys ðVHLSS 2002Þ. Research coordinators from the Vietnam Institute of
Economics helped in contacting local government ofﬁcials and asked them to
invite the head of each of the 25 households that were involved in the 2002
survey to participate in our experiment. The participation rate was high since
21 individuals participated in each village. The average missing households
did not participate mainly because of their relocations to other places.
12 In the north ðRed River DeltaÞ, the villages are Yen Lac Truang and Yen Lac Lienchau in Vinh
Phuc province and Thai Hoa and Diem Dien in Thai Binh province. In the south ðMekong DeltaÞ,
the villages are Thot Not and Co Do Trung in Can Tho province and TraVinh Thanh and Phuoc
Hao in TraVinh province. These villages are different from those surveyed by Tanaka et al. ð2010Þ.
We ran one session in each village to avoid contamination effects.
13 One commune in the north and one in the south had an odd number of observations. In these
two communes, we asked a research assistant to participate in the trust game so that all participants
could be paired. Of course, we do not include the data from the research assistants in the analysis.
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As regards the second source of bias, we acknowledge that we have no
control on how the individual was selected within each household. We com-
pare statistics on age, gender, education, and income of actual participants and
invited participants. We ﬁnd that in the south, the actual participants differ
signiﬁcantly from the invited participants in terms of education and age ðin-
vited participants are younger and more educatedÞ. In the north the actual
participants differ signiﬁcantly from the invited participants as regards their
gender composition ðthe actual participants include more femalesÞ. Reassur-
ingly, there is no evidence of selection bias in terms of the household’s income
ðprecise statistics are available on requestÞ.
The experimental sessions started at 8 a.m. and lasted about 3 hours, in-
cluding payment and the postexperimental demographic survey. Participants
were given instructions including a description of the game, examples, and
record sheets with a series of questions to be answered for each game. Illiterate
subjects ð3%Þ were given oral instructions. Participants who had difﬁculty
completing record sheets by themselves were also helped by assistants. On
average, participants earned KVND 120 ðabout $7Þ, roughly 3–4 days’ wage
for casual unskilled labor. They were paid in private in a separate room.
D. Pool of Participants
Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics by region. The characteristics in the
ﬁrst panel are those reported by the participants and those in the second panel
were elicited during the experiment.
According to Mann-Whitney tests in which each individual is an indepen-
dent observation, the participants from the north are slightly older and more
educated on average than those from the south. Proportion tests indicate that
the share of females is higher in the north. The proportions of participants
holding an occupation in agriculture and having a secondary job are fairly
balanced in the two regions.While participants are more loss averse in the north
than in the south, time preferences do not differ signiﬁcantly across regions.
The probability weighting parameter ðaÞ is signiﬁcantly smaller than 1, and
the loss aversion parameter ðλÞ is signiﬁcantly greater than 1 in both regions
ðt-tests, p < .001Þ. This ﬁnding rejects the EU function and shows that utility
is better described by an inverted S-shaped utility function ðthey overweight
small probabilities and underweight large onesÞ and by loss aversion. The
mean estimated values of a, σ are ð0.633, 0.553Þ for the north and ð0.645,
0.569Þ for the south.14 These values are close to those estimated by Tanaka
14 Ordinary least squares ðOLSÞ estimates of the curvature of the utility function against individual
characteristics show that participants with a higher income are more risk seeking ðσ is lowerÞ and
that, controlling for absolute income, those who have a higher relative income are more risk averse. In
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et al. ð2010Þ for the north ð0.74, 0.59Þ and the south ð0.74, 0.63Þ of Vietnam
and to those found by Liu ð2013Þ with the same method for farmers in China
ð0.69, 0.48Þ. Our estimation of λ is 3.542 in the north and 2.676 in the south
ðthey were 2.63 in Tanaka et al. 2010; 3.47 in Liu 2013Þ.15
Regarding time preferences, the mean values of the time discounting rate
ðrÞ and of the present bias parameter ðbÞ are 0.005 and 0.610, respectively, in
the north and 0.003 and 0.560, respectively, in the south.16 In Tanaka et al.
ð2010Þ, the estimates were 0.008 for r and 0.644 for b, showing that our
participants aremore present biased. In our estimates, b is signiﬁcantly different
the south only, older participants are more risk averse, but this relationship is not linear. In the north
only, higher education is associated with a higher risk aversion. The regression of risk parameters against
demographic variables is available on request.
15 Regression results for loss aversion show that older participants are less loss averse, but the rela-
tionship is U-shaped. Richer participants are more loss averse, but a higher relative income reduces loss
aversion.
16 Regression results for discount rate and present bias conclude that females are marginally less
patient than males ðr is higherÞ, and participants who hold a second job are less present biased ðb is
higherÞ. In the south, we found that females and older participants are more present biased, but this
relationship is nonlinear; richer participants are also more present biased, but having a higher
relative income decreases the present bias.
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS BY REGION
North South Total
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Characteristics reported by the participants:
Age 53.15 11.77 47.28*** 9.94 50 11.30
Female .57 .50 .32*** .47 .45 .50
Years of education 8.47 4.59 7.15** 3.62 7.8 4.19
First job in agriculture .70 .46 .62 .49 .66 .47
Holding a second job .44 .50 .38 .49 .41 .49
Total income 42.37 51.61 34.95 28.17 38.73 41.83
Characteristics elicited in the experiment:
Probability weighting ðaÞ .633 .206 .645 .241 .638 .223
Risk aversion ðjÞ .553 .275 .569 .274 .561 .274
Loss aversion ðλÞ 3.542 3.242 2.676** 3.056 3.130 3.175
Time discounting rate ðrÞ .005 .014 .003 .012 .004 .013
Present bias ðbÞ .610 .610 .560 .560 .586 .161
Number of participants 87 79 166
Note. Signiﬁcance is of either Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests or proportion tests comparing the sample
from the north and the sample from the south. The midpoint of the lower and upper bounds of the
switching point in questions of series 3 in game 1 is λ, and it takes different values when risk aversion
ðjÞ differs. Here, we used the values of λ corresponding to j5 1. The estimated value of λwould gain much
the same result using different values of the risk aversion parameter ðsee Tanaka et al. 2010, 560Þ. The level
of signiﬁcance of the comparison between north and south is not affected when taking other values of j.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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from 1 in both regions ðp < .001Þ, which tends to reject the exponential-
discounting model and supports the quasi-hyperbolic discounting approach.
III. Results
We now turn to analyzing the results from the trust game. We ﬁrst show sum-
mary statistics. Then, we explore the determinants of trust and trustworthiness
by means of a regression analysis.
A. Summary Statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics by region. We ﬁrst consider the mean
amount sent by the trustors. Trustees’ trustworthiness is captured by the mean
proportion of total wealth returned by the trustees conditional on each amount
possibly sent by the trustor. Table 2 also mentions the mean return expected by
TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON DECISIONS, BY REGION
All North South p-Value
Mean amount sent by trustors 9.85 ð5.12Þ 9.43 ð4.91Þ 10.32 ð5.33Þ .289
% trustors sending 0 1.20 1.15 1.27
% trustors sending 5 37.35 39.08 35.44
% trustors sending 10 37.35 41.38 32.91 .539*
% trustors sending 15 11.45 6.90 16.46
% trustors sending 20 12.65 11.49 13.92
Mean expected return 16.69 ð10.99Þ 14.05 ð8.63Þ 19.61 ð12.52Þ .004
Mean amount sent by trustees:
If trustor sends 5 10.77 ð5.61Þ 9.72 ð5.01Þ 11.93 ð6.03Þ .012
If trustor sends 10 16.46 ð8.42Þ 14.06 ð5.65Þ 19.10 ð10.06Þ .001
If trustor sends 15 20.82 ð10.90Þ 15.79 ð6.97Þ 24.87 ð11.81Þ <.001
If trustor sends 20 25.54 ð12.86Þ 20.98 ð9.46Þ 30.57 ð14.23Þ <.001
Mean percentage of total wealth ðamount
sent  3 1 endowmentÞ sent to trustors:
If trustor sends 5 30.78 ð16.04Þ 27.78 ð14.32Þ 34.09 ð17.23Þ .012
If trustor sends 10 32.92 ð16.84Þ 28.11 ð11.30Þ 38.20 ð20.13Þ .001
If trustor sends 15 32.02 ð16.77Þ 24.30 ð10.72Þ 38.26 ð18.18Þ .001
If trustor sends 20 31.97 ð16.08Þ 26.22 ð11.82Þ 38.21 ð17.79Þ <.001
Mean % 31.81 ð12.97Þ 26.91 ð8.89Þ 37.20 ð14.58Þ <.001
Percentage of trustees sending more than
amount received  3:
If trustor sends 5 8.43 4.60 12.66 .063
If trustor sends 10 3.61 0 7.59 .009
If trustor sends 15 2.13 0 3.85 .117
If trustor sends 20 .60 0 1.26 .294
Note. Samples include 87 observations for the north and 79 for the south. However, due to mistakes in
recording data, 25 observations are missing for the return of trustees in case the trustor has sent 15 ðone
village with 24 observations in the north and one observation in the southÞ. Amounts are expressed in
KVND. p-values are from two sample Mann-Whitney rank sum tests comparing the north and south
samples. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
* Corresponds to a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions for all possible
amounts sent.
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the trustors and the percentage of trustees who return more than the tripled
amount sent by the trustor. Figure 1 displays the expectations of the trustors
depending on the amount they send to the trustee, by region ðexcluding the two
participants who sent nothingÞ.
Table 2 shows that the mean amount sent by the trustors is KVND 9.85,
which represents 49.25% of the initial endowment. Trustors transfer 47.15%
of their endowment in the north and 51.60% in the south, but the difference
is not statistically signiﬁcant. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test concludes that the
distribution of transfers does not differ across regions. Overall, the senders’
behavior in both regions is comparable with other studies.17
The amount sent is motivated in part by the expectation of reciprocity. Fig-
ure 1 shows that higher transfers are associated with higher expectations of re-
turn in absolute terms. Interestingly, trustors in the north expect on average
lower returns from their counterpart ð14.05Þ than trustors in the south ð19.61,
p 5 .004Þ, except those who send all their endowment. This indicates that
individuals behave similarly in the north and in the south, although the former
are less conﬁdent on the return of their transfer.
Regarding trustees’ behavior, the Nash equilibrium of a null return is almost
never played ðone observation when the transfer is 5 or 10 and three obser-
vations when it is 15Þ. Trustees return on average 31.81% of their wealth to
the trustor ðSD 5 12.97Þ.18 The mean percentage returned is signiﬁcantly
higher in the south ð37.20, SD 5 14.58Þ than in the north ð26.91, SD 5
8.89; p < .001Þ, for any amount sent by the trustor. The standard deviation
of the percentage returned for each amount sent is smaller in the north than
in the south. This is consistent with the idea that market integration—that
started earlier in the south—tends to foster norms that lead to more reciproc-
17 In a meta-analysis of the trust game, Johnson and Mislin ð2011a, 2011bÞ show that, on average,
trustors send 50.88% of their endowment, although variations across studies are large. This pro-
portion is 51.60% in Berg et al. ð1995Þ and 49.50% in the American-subjects sample in the
impersonal communication treatment of Buchan et al. ð2006Þ. We are aware that higher stakes tend
to reduce trust. In our case, KVND 20 represent between half a day’s and a full day’s wage. For a
stake of a full day’s wage in Russia, Bahry and Wilson ð2004Þ found that 62% of the subjects send
at least 50% of their endowment. We found 61.45% in our sample. Studying trust with a public
goods game, Carpenter et al. ð2004Þ found that Vietnamese were more trusting than Thais, but the
result may be driven by the possibility to sanction deviations from the norm. Comparing American
students and recent immigrants from Vietnam, Parks and Vu ð1994Þ found that Vietnamese were
more cooperative in public goods games.
18 Surveying 75 studies, Johnson and Mislin ð2011aÞ ﬁnd a mean rate of return of 36.51% of the
tripled amount received, which simply compensates—on average—trustors. In Buchan et al.
ð2006Þ, the mean rate of return was is 37% and 11% of the trustees returned nothing.
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ity. However, simple comparisons should be taken with care since the two sam-
ples present differences in terms of participants’ characteristics.
The absolute amount returned to the trustor increases in the amount po-
tentially received, conﬁrming that trustees are willing to return the trust ex-
pressed by the trustors. However, the amount returned represents a stable
percentage of the total wealth as the amount received from the trustor increases.
The only signiﬁcant difference is when the trustor sends 10 compared to 5
ðWilcoxon test, p 5 .003Þ. Most people do not try to equalize payoffs, which
would require that the trustee sends back two-thirds of the tripled amount
received ði.e., an increasing proportion of total wealthÞ. Many players recip-
rocate, but they also exploit to some extent the trustors. Table 2 also indicates
that a small fraction of the trustees send more than the amount received when
transfers are low, increasing inequality at the beneﬁt of the other player. This
suggests that a low transfer is not necessarily interpreted as a lack of trust and
that some trustees express unconditional other-regarding preferences, consis-
tent with Cox ð2004Þ and Ashraf et al. ð2006Þ. To investigate further the de-
terminants of behavior, we proceed now to an econometric analysis.
Figure 1. Trustors’ expectations regarding the amount sent back by the trustees, by region and amount sent.
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B. Econometric Analysis
Our empirical exercise is based on the following model speciﬁcation:
Y 5 f ðθ;X Þ1 ε;
where Y represents trust or trustworthiness, v is the vector of risk and time
preferences parameter, X is a vector of demographic variables, and ε is the
standard error term.
Trustor’s Behavior
Table 3 reports the results of regressions in which the dependent variable is the
amount sent by the trustors. Since this variable takes categorical values ð0, 5,
10, 15, or 20Þ, we estimate ordered probit models on the whole sample
ðmodels 1 and 2Þ, the north subsample ðmodel 3Þ and the south subsample
ðmodel 4Þ. Except inmodel 1, we include village ﬁxed effects in the estimations
to control for possible different levels of development. The independent var-
iables include the expectation of the individual regarding the amount returned
by the trustee since we expect that the amount sent is partly motivated by the
expectation of reciprocity. The models also account for the estimated param-
eters for risk attitudes ðprobability weighting, a; risk aversion, σ; and loss
aversion, λÞ and for time preferences ðtime discounting rate, r ; and present
bias, bÞ.19 We control for the number of acquaintances in the session since
individuals may be more trustful with their anonymous counterpart if it is
more likely that they know him personally ðsee the importance of the target
in trust games in McEvily et al. ½2012 or of social distance in Song, Cadsby,
and Bi ½2012Þ. We control for demographic variables ðage and age2, gender,
and years of educationÞ, the occupational status ðﬁrst job being in agriculture,
holding a second jobÞ, and both absolute and relative income.20 Table A4 in
19 The midpoint of the lower bound and upper bound of the switching point in questions of
series 3 in game 1 is λ, and it takes different values when risk aversion ðσÞ differs. In all the re-
gression analysis reported in this article, we use the values of λ corresponding to σ 5 1. Tanaka et al.
ð2010Þ show that the choice of σ would have no effect on the estimation of λ. That said, we also
estimated all our models with a value of λ given by σ 5 0.2 and by σ 5 0.6 ðnot reported here but
available on requestÞ. The results are not affected.
20 Financial data come from the VHLSS 2002. Total income has been reconstituted by adding all
the sources of income of the households as detailed in the survey. Since the experiment was already
more than 3 hours long, it would have been difﬁcult to collect truthful additional information on
the various ﬁnancial resources at the end of the sessions. Relative income measures the household’s
relative status in the village. It is calculated as the ratio of each household’s income to the mean
income of the participants from the same village. Total income may be endogenous, as it may
inﬂuence trust, but it may also be determined by the ability to trust others. For that reason, we have
reestimated these models using rainfall at the time and location of the 2002 survey as an exogenous
instrument for income. Indeed, weather is likely to inﬂuence income, as most participants hold jobs
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appendix 4, available online, complements this analysis by reporting OLS
estimates of the determinants of the expected return as the dependent variable,
including the same independent variables as in table 3. These beliefs should
not be affected by efﬁciency concerns or altruism; thus, combined with the
decision regarding the amount to send, they allow us to better characterize the
trust of the senders. Models 1 and 2 consider the whole sample without and
with village ﬁxed effects, respectively; model 3, the north subsample; and
model 4, the south subsample.21
Table 3 indicates that the senders’ behavior is highly signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced
by the expected return from the trustees: the more people expect to receive in
return, the more they trust and the more they send to others. Note that the
amount sent may capture not only trust but also altruism.22 The amount sent
above the expected return probably captures some other-regarding preferences.
But since we have no independent measure of individuals’ degree of altruism,
we cannot isolate trust.
We also note that there is no signiﬁcant difference between the north and
the south. However, a test comparing the coefﬁcients associated with the ex-
pected return in the two regions indicates that for a given level of expectation,
people in the north send signiﬁcantly more ðp 5 .046Þ, although they hold
lower expectations compared to people in the south ðtable A4Þ.
The second important result is that when we pool all the data together
ðmodels 1 and 2Þ, neither risk preferences nor time preferences have a sig-
niﬁcant inﬂuence on the amount sent ðtable 3Þ or on the expectations of re-
turn ðtable A4Þ, tending to conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Eckel and Wilson ð2004Þ,
Ashraf et al. ð2006Þ, Houser et al. ð2010Þ, and McEvily et al. ð2012Þ. How-
ever, if we reestimate model 1 without including the expected return variable
ðavailable on requestÞ, we ﬁnd that the loss aversion parameter becomes sig-
related to agriculture, but it has no reason to correlate with trust. In the ﬁrst stage, we have esti-
mated the correlation between income and rainfall, which is signiﬁcant at the 1% level, to calculate
a predicted value of income. In the second stage, we have estimated ordered probit models including
the predicted value of income among the independent variables. Since the results are qualitatively
unchanged, we do not report these regressions.
21 We also tested an instrumental variables two-stage least-squares model, instrumenting income
with rainfall. Results are qualitatively similar to those reported in table A4, and therefore, we do not
report them here.
22 Indeed, trustors can send money because of other social preferences such as joint welfare or altru-
ism and not only because they trust others. In particular, Carter and Castillo ð2003Þ, Cox ð2004Þ, and
Ashraf et al. ð2006Þ have shown that this game also captures other-regarding preferences. By manip-
ulating receiver’s endowments, Brülhart and Usunier ð2012Þ have found, however, that trust is the
dominant motivation for senders in this game. Eliciting beliefs also shows that expectations about the
return play a major role in the sending decision ðChaudhuri and Gangadharan 2007Þ.
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niﬁcant at the 10% level ðp 5 .082; but signiﬁcance vanishes when village
dummies are included in model 2Þ. The fact that loss aversion is marginally
signiﬁcant when we do not control for expectations but loses signiﬁcance when
we control for them suggests that loss aversion is mainly related to the trust
component of the sending decision. This effect is driven by the sample from
the north. Indeed, when we omit the expected return variable from model 3,
in the north more loss averse subjects are less likely to trust others, which is
consistent with the fact that trust involves a risk of loss if the second player
betrays ðp5 .039 without village ﬁxed effects, and p5 .092 with ﬁxed effectsÞ.
Table 3 also indicates that probability weighting has a borderline signiﬁcant
negative effect on the amount sent in the north ðmodel 3Þ, while a higher dis-
counting rate increases this amount in the south ðmodel 4Þ. This positive effect
of long-term impatience in the south is surprising.
A few other individual characteristics matter. Model 1 shows a borderline
signiﬁcant inverted U-shaped relationship between age and the amount sent
that is not inﬂuenced by differences in expectations related to age ðsee table A4Þ.
This result is consistent with previous ﬁndings ðCarpenter et al. 2004; Belle-
mare and Kröger 2007; Sutter and Kocher 2007Þ. But it is fragile, as it vanishes
when we include village ﬁxed effects ðmodel 2Þ. More educated participants
tend to be less trustful ðas in Schechter 2007; McEvily et al. 2012Þ, although
higher education is not correlated with lower expectations. Controlling for in-
come, holding a second job greatly increases the amount sent. This result is
driven by the south subsample. We do not ﬁnd any direct effect of the level of
income, in contrast with Bellemare and Kröger ð2007Þ. We ﬁnd no effect of
gender ðsimilarly to Croson and Buchan 1999; Ashraf et al. 2006; Cox and
Deck 2006Þ, although females expect lower returns than males, especially in
the north ðsee table A4Þ, which may suggest that females’ decisions are driven
more by social preferences than by the expectation of reciprocity. In a survey on
20 studies of the trust game, Croson and Gneezy ð2009Þ ﬁnd that gender is
reported to inﬂuence trust in 12 of them.
We summarize our main results on the trustors’ behavior as follows:
Result 1: The amounts sent by the trustors are partly driven by the expectation of return
from the trustee. People in the north do not send less than people in the south, although
they are more pessimistic in terms of expected returns than people in the south.
Result 2: Contrary to conjectures 1 and 3, risk aversion and present bias do not
inﬂuence the amount sent in general. Supporting conjecture 1, loss aversion decreases
the amount sent in the north subsample ðbut only if we omit the expected returnÞ,
and probability weighting has the same directional effect. Higher time discounting
increases trust in the south subsample.
Nguyen, Villeval, and Xu 563
This content downloaded from 159.084.201.001 on April 11, 2016 04:37:48 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Trustees’ Behavior
Table 4 displays the results of OLS estimates in which the dependent variable
is the percentage of total wealth ðthree times the potential amount sent by the
trustor plus the endowmentÞ that is sent back by the trustee to the trustor.23
Since each trustee’s decision is observed four times ðwhen the sender sends him
5, 10, 15, and 20Þ,24 robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level,
and we include village ﬁxed effects except in model 1. Like in previous studies,
we only consider the cases in which the sender has sent a positive amount. In
all regressions, the set of independent variables is the same as in table 3, except
that we include a variable indicating the amount potentially sent by the trustor
ðthat takes values 5, 10, 15, or 20Þ, and we exclude the expected return.
While additional regressions ðavailable on requestÞ show that the amount
returned to the trustors increases in the level of trust, models 1 and 2 in table 4
show that the proportion returned is independent on the amount received
ðconsistent with Berg et al. ½1995 in the absence of social history and with Barr
½2003Þ. This hides, in fact, two opposite behaviors according to the region.
Indeed, the amount sent by the trustor has a nonsigniﬁcant but negative in-
ﬂuence on the proportion of wealth returned in the north ðmodel 3, p5 .112Þ,
while it has a signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence in the south ðmodel 4Þ. We have
also checked with separate regressions that, for each given amount sent, the
proportion returned is signiﬁcantly higher in the south than in the north. Holm
and Danielson ð2005Þ also found in Tanzania a negative relationship between
the amount sent and the amount returned. They attribute this ﬁnding to the
fact that—given a share of the amount received—a higher proportion of the
endowment sent by the trustor makes it more expensive for the trustee to
return.
Overall, these ﬁndings indicate that people in the south are more reciprocal
than in the north, consistent with Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen ð2013Þ in
which trustors and trustees had to make choices conditional on the income
level of the player they were matched with. A closer examination of our data
cannot explain this difference by the use of different heuristics in the two re-
gions ðe.g., returning a ﬁxed percentage of wealth such as the midpoint of
the rangeÞ. We investigated whether the regional difference could be driven
23 Since we have only 10 censored observations out of 576, Tobit models are not required. We also
estimated an instrumental variables two-stage least-squares model in which rainfall instruments total
income. Most results are qualitatively unaffected.
24 Except for 23 participants who were observed only three times because of a mistake in registering
the amount returned in one village when receiving KVND 15. Note that we have reestimated the
models reported in table 3 with only 133 participants. The results are unaffected.
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by differences in expectations about others’ trustworthiness when subjects play
the role of a trustor. In additional regressions ðavailable on requestÞ, we ﬁnd that
the higher the expectation of returnwhen in the role of a trustor, themore people
return when in the role of a trustee, but this relationship is signiﬁcant only in the
north ðp 5 .007Þ. This suggests that the difference in returning behavior is
driven partly by the fact that in the north, only those who have higher ex-
pectations on others’ reciprocity return a higher proportion themselves. Further
research is needed to explore whether this difference may result from a longer
exposure of populations to collectivist organizations in the north—especially for
more educated people—and a longer exposure to market economy in the south,
which may have developed different norms or a different knowledge of what
shared norms of fairness are. Indeed, it has been shown in particular that market
integration is associated with increased levels of fairness and generosity
ðEnsminger and Henrich 2014Þ.25
The proportion returned is not affected by loss aversion. Somewhat sur-
prisingly since the return decision does not involve any risk, the three regres-
sions of table 4 indicate that the proportion returned increases signiﬁcantly
ðexcept in the northÞ in the concavity of the utility function ðσÞ. Eckel and
Wilson ð2004Þ have arrived at the same ﬁnding. Additional separate regres-
sions by level of trust show that risk aversion signiﬁcantly increases the pro-
portion returned when the amount sent was either 5 or 10, whereas it has
no signiﬁcant inﬂuence for higher levels of trust. A possible interpretation is
that although our game setting is anonymous, anxiety about the fact that not
reciprocating could be considered unfair ðbecause of breaking a social normÞ is
more cogent when the decision is more difﬁcult, that is, when the trustor has
sent a smaller amount ðindeed, the decision is easier for a pro-social trustee to
return a high amount to a trustor who behaved trustfully, but it requires more
deliberation when the trustor has sent a small amountÞ. This interpretation as-
sumes that the risk aversion parameter captures anxiety in not only themonetary
domain but also the social domain.
25 Uslaner ð2008Þ and Brosig-Koch et al. ð2011Þ suggest that a communist regime affects cooperation
negatively. Its effects on trust and redistributive preferences seem durable ðsee Alesina and Fuchs-
Schündeln 2007; Rainer and Siedler 2009, on Germany after reuniﬁcationÞ; see also Ockenfels and
Weimann ð1998Þ on solidarity in Eastern and Western Germany. Voors et al. ð2012Þ show that
historical events such as wars have long-term effects on social and individual preferences. Ensminger
ð2001Þ ﬁnds with dictator games played in Kenya that market experience teaches fairness. Johnson
and Mislin ð2011aÞ mention that the greater is market integration, the more people learn signals on
how others expect them to behave in social interactions. Competitive markets favor the formation of
shared norms. Note, however, that we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of subjects’ age that could capture the
length of exposure to collectivism or to market economy.
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While the proportion returned never depends on long-run patience—the
r parameter—it increases signiﬁcantly and greatly with short-run patience ði.e.,
the b parameter; this effect is driven by the south sampleÞ. This ﬁnding is ex-
pected, considering that more present-biased individuals are more willing to trade
off a short-run beneﬁt for long-run costs in general. Conversely, less impulsive
people may be more used to forgoing an immediate beneﬁt in exchange for a
long-run beneﬁt in their real life.26
Finally, models 1–3 show that in the north more educated individuals and
females return a lower proportion of their wealth compared to less educated
individuals and males. Barr ð2003Þ and Schechter ð2007Þ also found a neg-
ative relationship between gender and trustworthiness and suggest that, in rural
villages, women are less used to getting access to money on their own and are
therefore less willing to give it up. In the north, holding a job in agriculture also
has a negative impact on the proportion returned. The number of acquain-
tances, absolute and relative incomes, and age do not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
the proportion returned. This contrasts with studies conducted in Europe in
which older people are more trustworthy than younger ones ðBellemare and
Kröger 2007; Sutter and Kocher 2007Þ.
Our main ﬁndings regarding the trustees’ behavior can be summarized as
follows:
Result 3: The proportion of total wealth returned by the trustees to the trustor tends
to decrease with the amount sent by the trustor in the north, while it increases in the
south, suggesting that people in the north act less reciprocally.
Result 4: In contrast to conjecture 2, risk aversion increases the proportion of wealth
returned to the trustor, but loss aversion has no effect. Supporting conjecture 4, less
present-biased trustees return a higher proportion of their wealth to the trustor;
however, time discounting has no inﬂuence.
IV. Conclusion
We have investigated the impact of risk attitudes and time preferences on trust
and trustworthiness by conducting an artifactual ﬁeld experiment in the north
and in the south of Vietnam. While previous studies have explored the links
between risk attitudes and trust in the framework of the EU theory without
26 To test whether people behave in the experiment as they behave in their real life, we asked the
following question in the postexperiment survey: “generally speaking, would you say that people in
your village can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful?” A binary trust variable was created.
However, we did not ﬁnd any correlation between this variable and patience or between this variable
and the proportion returned. Holm and Danielson ð2005Þ also found that in Tanzania answers to
survey trust questions did not correlate with behavior in the trust game.
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delivering a consensual response, the novel contribution of this article is in
adopting a richer perspective permitted by the use of both the prospect theory
and nonstandard theories of intertemporal preferences.
Our analysis shows that the amount sent by the trustors is not affected by the
concavity of the utility function, loss aversion, or present bias. These results
complement those of Eckel and Wilson ð2004Þ, Ashraf et al. ð2006Þ, Houser
et al. ð2010Þ, and McEvily et al. ð2012Þ. However, we also found that a higher
time discounting increases the amount sent in the south, while probability
weighting decreases it in the north. This suggests that without contradicting
the standard approach, the richer perspective permitted by the prospect theory
and the hyperbolic time preferences approach gives a more precise picture of
the role of risk attitudes and time preferences on trusting behavior.
While time discounting and loss aversion do not inﬂuence trustworthiness,
more risk-averse and less present-biased trustees return a higher share of their
wealth to the trustor. An interpretation is that in real settings individuals know
that not reciprocating others’ trust entails a risk of social sanctions. Since the
returning decision does not involve any monetary risk, our measure of risk
attitudes may possibly also capture some aspects of social risks. Less present-
biased individuals ðthose who are more future orientedÞ are more trustworthy
possibly because in real settings they are more aware that a short-run beneﬁt
may be detrimental to long-run interactions.
Finally, our results show evidence of important regional differences in social
preferences, with people in the north of Vietnam holding lower expectations
about others’ reciprocity and behaving less reciprocally than people in the
south. These differences in behavior may be related to differences in the his-
tory of communism between the two regions and a longer market integration
in the south that may have favored norms of fairness. Even many years after
political reuniﬁcation, regional speciﬁcities persist. Our ﬁndings are very
consistent with those studies on Germany, showing that East Germans who
have been exposed to communist institutions showed less trust and less sol-
idarity even long after reuniﬁcation ðOckenfels and Weimann 1998; Rainer
and Siedler 2009; Brosig-Koch et al. 2011Þ. Further investigations are needed
to explore how long political institutions and norms shape preferences and
expectations even after having been replaced by others.
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